In international relations, multi-alignment is a foreign policy strategy in which a state simultaneously cultivates strategic partnerships with multiple major powers or blocs, aligning with different actors on different issues, in order to maximize strategic autonomy and national interests. It is primarily applied to the Indian foreign policy under Narendra Modi and S. Jaishankar.[1][2][3]
Indian diplomat Shashi Tharoor claims to have introduced the term in the 2000s, using it at the annual conference of Indian ambassadors in 2009 to "a frosty reception."[4] It gained widespread recognition when India's External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar used it in 2020.[4] Jaishankar has acknowledged Tharoor's claim.[5] Separately, Parag Khanna has claimed to have coined it in 2007.[6] Khanna and Raja Mohan wrote in a 2006 paper: "A neo-Curzonian foreign policy is premised on the logic of Indian centrality, permitting multidirectional engagement--or "multi-alignment"--with all major powers and seeking access and leverage from East Africa to Pacific Asia."[1][7]
Ian Hall identified three elements of Indian multialignment: 1) membership in various forums, 2) strategic partnerships, 3) normative hedging.[1] It has been distinguished from the "multi-vector" of post-Soviet states like Kazakhstan, which involves distancing from a dominant former hegemon and Yevgeny Primakov's Russian model of multipolarity that applied equidistance among power centres.[2]
It has been described as an increasingly common strategy in the age of multipolarity and apparent end of U.S. global hegemony in the 2020s.[8] Beyond India, it has been discussed by analysts as an actual or potential foreign policy pursued by Indonesia,[9] Brazil,[10] the United Arab Emirates,[11] and others.[12][13]
References
- ^ a b c Hall, Ian (3 May 2016). "Multialignment and Indian Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi". The Round Table. 105 (3): 271–286. doi:10.1080/00358533.2016.1180760.
- ^ a b O'Donnell, Frank; Papa, Mihaela (10 May 2021). "India's multi-alignment management and the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle". International Affairs. 97 (3): 801–822. doi:10.1093/ia/iiab036.
- ^ Raghavan, P.S. (2017). "The Making of India's Foreign Policy: From Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment". Indian Foreign Affairs Journal. 12 (4): 326–341. ISSN 0973-3248.
- ^ a b Tharoor, Shashi (October 13, 2024). "I, Shashi Tharoor, coined the term 'multi-alignment'". The Week.
- ^ "Tharoor thanks Jaishankar for giving him 'credit' for term 'multi-alignment', posts selfie". ThePrint. Press Trust of India. 26 April 2022.
the term 'Multi-alignment' which I floated 15 years ago
- ^ Khanna, Parag (21 January 2017). "To beat populism, blend democracy and technocracy, S'pore style". The Straits Times.
A decade ago I coined the term "multi-alignment"...
- ^ Khanna, Parag; Mohan, Raja (February–March 2006). "Getting India Right". Policy Review. Hoover Institution.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: date format (link) - ^ Latham, Andrew (18 May 2024). "As American global hegemony ends, multi-alignment rises". The Hill.
- ^ Wicaksana, I Gede Wahyu; Yakti, Probo Darono (November 2025). "Indonesia's New Partial Multialignment Strategy: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis". TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia. 13 (2): 264–281. doi:10.1017/trn.2025.1.
- ^ Stuenkel, Oliver (November 20, 2025). "Multi-Alignment as Strategy: How Brazil Navigates Between Washington, Beijing, and the Global South". Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
- ^ Bunskoek, Raoul; Janardhan, Narayanappa; Szalai, Máté; Koster, Tobias (22 October 2025). "The UAE's Strategy of Multi-Alignment: A Dilemma for the EU and OECD?". Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. Archived from the original on 25 February 2026.
- ^ Vij, Samriddhi (24 September 2025). "Reassessing Qatar's Multi-Alignment Strategy". Observer Research Foundation.
- ^ Kopalyan, Nerses (January 22, 2026). "Armenia's Doctrine of Multi-Alignment: Strategic Partnerships, Not Alliances". EVN Report.
