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A news item involving 2015 Philadelphia train derailment was featured on Wikipedia's Main Page in the In the news section on 14 May 2015.

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There's a bit of misinformation on this page (and in the rather protracted discussion about ATC on this Talk page).

The official investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board has completed long ago, and the NTSB accident report has been published. This report contains a distillation of the facts uncovered in the investigation. Further information in the form of raw factual reports are also available on the NTSB website in the accident docket. The NTSB docket search engine makes direct links difficult, but the search engine will yield information if one keys the accident ID DCA15MR010. The information pertinent to this discussion is given in the document titled Signal factual.

With the accident report and docket completed and made public, IMHO there should no longer be any need to rely upon mass media accounts, which oftentimes reflect an ignorance of railroad terminology and technology, or are sensationalist in the hope of adding to advertising revenue.

I quote a very long passage from the Signal factual document verbatim (with some less pertinent parts omitted). The highlighting has been added by me to emphasize the most significant details:

4.1 Description of Railroad Signal System

Shore Interlocking, MP 82.1 consists of 15 Union Switch and Signal M-3 power switch machines. There are a total of 10 PL-3 Signals. All main tracks on the Northeast Corridor are equipped with Cab Signals and all trains operating on the NEC are equipped with Automatic Train Control (ATC) consisting of cab signals with speed control.

...

Following an accident that occurred at Boston’s Back Bay station on December 12, 1990, Amtrak and FRA reviewed all curves on the Northeast Corridor (NEC) where trains might reach overturning speed if the operator failed to reduce speed from Normal Speed as the train approached the restricted curve. There were 10 curves where this could possibly occur between Boston and Washington, DC. On each of these curves where the overturning speed of the curve was less than the Normal Speed approaching the curve, a cab signal change point was added to drop the cab signal from Clear to Approach Medium for a calculated period of time. The time was calculated such that a train traveling at Normal Speed would be forced to slow down to the curve speed or well below overturning speed before the cab signal was upgraded back to clear.

Using the criteria described above and agreed to by FRA and Amtrak, a cab signal downgrade was installed to slow westbound trains traveling from Holmes interlocking to Shore interlocking to enforce a speed reduction from the Normal Speed of 110 mph to the curve speed. Since Normal speed for trains traveling eastbound towards Shore interlocking was 80 mph, which was below overturning speed (98 mph) for the curves east of Shore, no cab signal code change was installed. The thinking at that time was that no train would be exceeding 80 mph and even if it continued at that speed, the train would be well under overturning speed. Amtrak is now in the process of reviewing what was done in 1991 and intends to modify the signal system such that trains traveling eastbound toward Shore interlocking will receive a cab signal downgrade to Approach Medium ensuring that their speed will be down to, or below, the timetable speed for the curves east of Shore before reaching them.

4.1A Positive Train Control

In 2000 Amtrak installed an overlay system to the ATC system known as ACSES, which stands for Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System on portions of the Northeast Corridor. Specifically this overlay system was installed between Cove interlocking in Boston, MA and Mill River interlocking in New Haven, CT on the New England Division; between County interlocking and Ham interlocking in New Jersey and between Ragan interlocking and Prince interlocking in Delaware and Maryland. The system was installed with the startup of the Acela service under an “Order or Particular Applicability” from FRA as a condition for operating at speeds over 125 mph.

The ACSES system was designed to enforce speeds that could not easily be enforced by the ATC system such as permanent speed restrictions on curves, bridges, etc. and maximum authorized speeds as prescribed in the operating timetable. The system was also designed to enforce a positive stop at interlocking home signals and also enforce temporary speed restrictions via a data radio communication system.

In 2010 FRA issued regulations for Positive Train Control systems in accordance with the Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2008. FRA recognized ACSES as meeting the requirements of a PTC system. ACSES was the first PTC system to be certified by FRA. Since the time the first ACSES system was installed technology had changed and some of the components of the system had become obsolete. For these reasons, and the fact that the commuter railroads announced that they would be installing ACSES on their property, required Amtrak to update the system. Part of this update was to replace the obsolete unlicensed 900 MHz data radio system with a licensed, secure data radio system for better coverage, security and reliability.

Since 2010 Amtrak has made several attempts to secure radio spectrum in the 217-220 MHz band. Amtrak appealed to FCC to no avail. FCC insisted that Amtrak procure the spectrum on the secondary market and Amtrak was unable to do so until late last year and has only very recently secured licenses from FCC. Meanwhile most of the installation of the wayside components (transponders, wayside interface units, radio towers and houses) has been completed. Large sections of the new territory are tested and ready for service except for the fact that the locomotive fleet is not yet equipped with the new data radios. Amtrak has installed new wayside data radios in parallel with the existing 900 MHz wayside radios so that conversion of the locomotive fleet to the new radio system can begin. Once the entire NEC locomotive fleet is equipped with the new radios, new sections of ACSES territory will be placed in service. The first section that will be placed in service is the section between Philadelphia and Washington, DC. This section has been fully installed and tested but cannot be placed in service until the locomotive fleet is fully equipped. This section will be followed by the Philadelphia to New York territory, then the Hellgate Line, Harrisburg Line, etc.

To sum up this very large excerpt from the NTSB document:

• ATC, which Amtrak calls Cab Signal System or CSS, is a system on Amtrak's lines that's capable of displays four signal indications in the cab, each indication being associated with a particular speed. The system enforces speed restrictions through a penalty brake application if the train's engineer fails to comply with the indicated speed reduction within a certain time period.
• Per the report, ATC was, in fact, installed on the tracks in question -- and was probably installed in the area involved well over a half century ago during the Pennsylvania Railroad era.
• Since its inception, ATC has typically been applied only to enforce signal-related speed restrictions, such as when one train is closing in on another train, or when a turnout or crossover is set for the diverging movements, say, to cross a train from one track to another. The geometry of these switches is such that, when set for a diverging movement, they can only be traversed at a reduced speed. Since spacing between trains and the exact routing it takes often depends on day-to-day positions, this information on wayside signals and cab signals is essential to speed control and avoiding collisions and overspeed derailments.
• ATC has not typically been applied to permanent civil speed restrictions like curves because those features and the associated speed restrictions are permanent, and qualified personnel know of their existence from the very first day they were trained on a line's physical characteristics. The thinking over the years was that a curve that had been in place since the 1800s didn't need cab signals.
• That view notwithstanding, Amtrak's experience with the 1990 Back Bay, Massachusetts train collision suggested changing the existing ATC to enforce a 45 mph speed restriction for certain curves where a train's maximum authorized speed approaching the curve was above overturning speed. This is why the ATC at Frankford Jct. was altered for westward trains -- they were approaching the curve from 110 mph track.
• The same change was not applied for eastward trains because they were approaching the curve from track with lower speeds, below overturning speed, and it was not considered likely that a train would accelerate prematurely before entering the curve. I think many people have conflated the absence of this modification for absence of ATC, which is not a correct interpretation of the facts.
• Since the accident, the Federal Railroad Administration has ordered the modification to be made at Frankford Jct. and elsewhere. Similar modifications were made after the December 2013 Spuyten Duyvil derailment. The two accidents bear a great deal in common, though in the New York derailment, it's likely that the engineer had a microsleep event at a critical time, just as the distraction by rock throwers and radio traffic about that subject may have played a part at Frankford Jct. JonRoma (talk) 21:40, 28 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]

As per WP:BURDEN, the burden for inserting material into an article lies with the editor who proposes to insert it. As a large chunk of material currently in the lede of the article has no source, I'm formally requesting that the editor in question provide sources for those statements. Wikipedia is an encyclopedia based on reliable sources, and material that can't be supported by a reliable source must be removed. NorthBySouthBaranof (talk) 04:32, 23 October 2015 (UTC)[reply]

Initially, there was talk of a projectile, which Bostian does not remember. There was also a claim by some conductor that she heard Bostian and another locomotive engineer discussing this by radio, a report which was apparently false. http://billypenn.com/2015/06/09/amtrak-188-four-weeks-later-what-weve-learned-and-what-we-still-dont-know/ Quote: "Was the train hit by a projectile, like a rock or a gunshot? Two others trains (one SEPTA and one Acela) operating on the same night reported being hit by projectiles of some sort in the same area where the Amtrak train derailed. One of the train’s conductors also told investigators that she overheard Bostian speaking over the radio about possibly being hit by something. However, the NTSB says tapes show that report never happened. FBI experts are examining the locomotive to search for other evidence of projectiles." 71.214.89.93 (talk) 04:52, 23 October 2015 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for finding the appropriate citation for that section. NorthBySouthBaranof (talk) 05:08, 23 October 2015 (UTC)[reply]

There may be new details in this beautifully written piece, just published. (Pinging E.M.Gregory, who worked hard on Rachel Jacobs' page; that said, she is mentioned here only in passing.) Vesuvius Dogg (talk) 01:02, 27 January 2016 (UTC)[reply]

You refer to this article as being "beautifully written". However, Tolkien's Lord of the Rings was also beautifully written, and yet it was complete fiction. Are you suggesting this article is accurate and complete, as well as being unbiased? Curiously, it was published a few days prior to the release of an extensive amount of information on the accident. It's hard to imagine that the author wouldn't have gotten early word of that release, which occurred on 1 Feb 2016. I wonder why the author would simply rehash the same old story when he probably knew that there would very shortly be an update as to the facts. Lurie2 (talk) 21:56, 13 February 2016 (UTC)[reply]

https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/amtrak-crash/charges-reinstated-against-amtrak-engineer-deadly-philadelphia-crash-n845141 "PHILADELPHIA — An Amtrak engineer was ordered Tuesday to stand trial for a deadly 2015 derailment in Philadelphia as a judge reinstated involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment charges." 2601:1C2:4E02:3020:4146:2231:C4F1:8E76 (talk) 22:39, 4 April 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Apparently there have been a series of dismissals of this case, followed by reinstatements. See: https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2020/05/15/judge-reinstates-charges-against-brandon-bostian-in-deadly-philadelphia-amtrak-crash/ "Ruling on an appeal brought by the state attorney general’s office, Stabile found the dismissal was based on fact-finding that should happen in a trial, a decision that McMonagle said would be appealed. Stabile said the lower court’s role was only to determine whether the state presented enough evidence to warrant a trial, and prosecutors met that burden, he ruled." It appears that at least two judges dismissed these charges based on false fact-finding that should have occurred at a trial, by a jury. Are there any factors involved that might motivate a judge or judges to improperly defend Brandon Bostian from these charges? Allassa37 (talk) 06:01, 17 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]

The section Criminal investigation, charges, and dismissal contains this sentence:

"On May 9, 2017, Philadelphia prosecutors said Bostian, the train's engineer, would not face any criminal charges because there was no evidence that he had acted with criminal intent."

The incompetence of such reasoning leaves me speechless.

Were the prosecutors seriously unaware that there exist laws against involuntary manslaughter?

This is just astonishing.

Note: I am in no way passing judgment on the engineer. I am only pointing out that lack of "criminal intent" is not sufficient reason not to charge someone.

This ought to be so obvious to anyone who has graduated from law school (as well as to any educated adult who has not graduated from law school) that I have to wonder exactly what was going through the prosecutors' minds (and palms) who initially decided that no criminal intent was reason to not charge the engineer. 2601:200:C000:1A0:E480:78DC:C9A5:A603 (talk) 02:47, 21 February 2022 (UTC)[reply]